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This paper provides a structural valuation model for exchangeable con-
vertible bonds, since such bonds are widespread by now. The model is
solved through the Hopscotch ﬁnite diﬀerence method. As the issuer owns
the underlying shares, exchangeable convertibles may be called and the
exchange option may be exercised even as the issuer experiences ﬁnancial
distress. The value of exchangeable convertibles always decreases in the
1volatility of the issuer’s assets (unlike the value of ordinary convertibles)
and decreases in the correlation between the underlying shares and the
issuer’s assets. The analysis conﬁrms that the dominant motive for issu-
ing exchangeable convertibles is likely to be to dispose of the underlying
shares.
Keywords: bond valuation, structural model, default risk, exchange-
able convertible, Hopscotch ﬁnite diﬀerence method.
JEL classiﬁcation: G13; G33.
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Exchangeable convertible bonds diﬀer from ”ordinary” convertible bonds in that
they are issued by a company (issuer) and can be exchanged for the shares of an-
other company (entity). Instead ”ordinary” convertible bonds can be exchanged
for shares of the issuer. So those who invest in exchangeable convertibles bear
the credit risk of the issuer and the equity risk of the entity, whereas those
who invest in ordinary convertibles bear the credit risk and the equity risk of
the issuer. Typically an exchangeable convertible is a bond that pays periodic
coupons and is callable at preset prices. The bond can be exchanged for a set
number of the entity’s shares at bond maturity or when the bond is called or
before maturity, if bondholders wish to do so.
In 2001 the global convertible bond market was worth 460 billion dollars and
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction of such market was made up of exchangeable convertible
bonds. By now the vast majority of new convertible issues in the UK are ex-
2changeable (FSA CP 149). Between 1998 and 2001 about 112 billion Euro worth
of exchangeable convertibles were issued in Europe alone and in October 2001
the Association of Convertible Bonds Management (hereafter ACBM) reported
that about one third of the European convertible bond market was made up
of exchangeable convertibles. In the US fourteen per cent of convertibles are
exchangeable as reported by Grimwood and Hodges (2002).
This paper attempts to ﬁll a gap in the literature. In fact past literature
has devoted much attention to the theoretical valuation of ordinary convertibles
through a ﬁrm value approach as in Ingersoll (1977), Brennan and Schwartz
(1977 and 1980), Nyborg (1996), Anderson, Pan and Sundaresan (1997 and
2000), or through an equity value approach as in McConnel J. and Schwartz E.
(1986), Loshak (1996), Davis and Lischka (1999) or Tsiveriotis and Fernandes
(1998). But such literature did not concentrate on the valuation of exchange-
able convertibles, probably because only in recent years the latter have become
widespread. Similarly the literature has devoted much attention to the possible
motivations for issuing ordinary convertible, but diﬀerent may be the motiva-
tions for the speciﬁc use of exchangeable convertibles. Hence this paper shows
how the valuation and use of exchangeable convertibles diﬀer from the valuation
and use of ordinary convertibles. In particular the valuation of exchangeable
convertibles should reﬂect the observation that ”the issuer normally has a long
position in the underlying shares and is disposing of a substantial shareholding”
(Financial Services Authority CP 149).
The model for valuing exchangeable convertibles is solved numerically through
3the Hopscotch ﬁnite diﬀerence method and the main conclusions of the present
analysis highlight the speciﬁcity of ”exchangeable convertibles” as follows. Firstly,
even when the issuer approaches ﬁnancial distress, the ”exchange option” is of-
ten valuable and worth exercising. Distress may not prevent the issuer from
calling the bond and force exercise of the exchange option. These features
markedly diﬀerentiate exchangeable from ordinary convertibles. The conver-
sion option of ordinary convertibles is often ”out-of-the-money” or lost when
the issuer is insolvent, whereas ”the rights accruing on the exchange property
after a default on the issuer” (ACBM 2001) are material in the valuation of
exchangeable convertibles. In particular, since the issuer normally owns the
shares underlying the exchange option, the issuer’s default may not compromise
investors’ right to exchange the bond, especially if before or after default the
underlying shares are pledged to investors as suggested by the ACBM1.
Secondly, if the exchange option can be exercised at any time, early exercise
allows exchangeable investors to obtain the shares before default very much
in the spirit of Stulz and Johnson (1987), who showed that early exercise of
an American vulnerable call option may be optimal even in the absence of
dividends. So pledge of the underlying shares and unrestricted early exercise
make exchangeable convertibles quite insensitive to the issuer’s credit risk.
Thirdly, higher volatility of the issuer’s assets decreases the value of an
exchangeable convertible, whereas it often increases the value of an ordinary
convertible by boosting the value of the ordinary conversion option. Moreover,
1The Association of Convertible Bonds Management suggested that ”the exchange property
should be pledged to the exchangeable investor upon default by the issuer”(2001).
4the value of an exchangeable convertible generally decreases as the correlation
between the underlying shares and the issuer’s assets rises.
The present analysis conﬁrms that the dominant motive for issuing exchange-
able convertibles is likely to be the disposal of the underlying shares. Further-
more, if the call price is high the shares are more likely to be disposed of as
investors exchange their bonds for shares while the issuer experiences ﬁnancial
distress. In such case exchange of the bonds for shares can avert the issuer’s
bankruptcy and signiﬁcantly reduce expected bankruptcy costs.
The paper is organised as follows. The structural valuation model for ex-
changeable convertibles is next presented under the assumption that the issuer
owns the shares. Then the exercise of the exchange option as the issuer experi-
ences distress is analysed in detail. Then the motives for issuing exchangeable
convertibles and the case in which the issuer does not own the underlying shares
are examined. The conclusions follow.
2T H E V A L U A T I O N M O D E L
This section presents a structural valuation model for exchangeable convertible
bonds. The issuer’s default risk is explicitly modelled. The usual assumptions
underlying structural models of credit risk are made also here, in particular
dynamic market completeness. The following are the main assumptions.
E (V,S,t) denotes the value of an exchangeable, which depends on time t,
on the value of the issuer’s assets V and on the total value of the shares S for
5which the bond can be exchanged. S and V follow the risk neutral processes
dS = Srdt+ Sσsdws (1)
dV = V (r − b)dt + Vσ vdwv (2)
where r is the default free short interest rate which is assumed constant over
time, σs is the entity’s shares volatility, b is the issuer’s assets payout rate, σv
is the issuer’s assets volatility, dws and dwv are the diﬀerentials of the Wiener
processes respectively driving S and V , such that dwv · dws = ρdt in the mean
square sense.
As stated above, the analysis of this paper hinges on the observation that the
issuer normally owns and keeps the shares worth S. So the issuer’s total assets
are here assumed to be the sum of the shares underlying the exchange option
worth S plus the remaining assets of the issuer worth V . This assumption will
heavily aﬀect the valuation of exchangeable convertibles.
The issuer defaults when it lacks the liquidity to honour coupon payment
obligations in the spirit of Kim-Ramaswamy-Sundaresan (1993). Since S is
assumed to pay no dividends and coupons payments are approximated as a
continuous stream, default is triggered as soon as V drops to the barrier Vd =
c·F+co·Fo
b (1 − τ),w h e r eτ is the corporate tax rate, c and F are respectively
the coupon rate and face value of the exchangeable bond, co and Fo are re-
spectively the coupon rate and face value of other debt outstanding in the
6issuer’s capital structure. The default barrier is constant over time, even at t =
T, the maturity date of the exchangeable. This assumption entails little loss
in generality, simpliﬁes the analysis and is suitable when F is small in com-
parison to Fo or when b is low. Default is followed by bankruptcy and the
recovery value of the bond deprived of the exchange option is assumed to be
R(Vd,S td) = min(max(Vd (1 − a)+Std − Fo,0),F),w h e r etd i st h ed a t ew h e n
default occurs, Std is the shares value at default and a is the fraction of assets
value V that is lost to bankruptcy costs after default.
A representative callable exchangeable convertible is now valued under the
assumption that the underlying shares S pay no dividends. The valuation model
applies to the "American" as well as to the "European" type exchangeable con-
vertible, since early exercise will not be optimal before maturity. The convertible
is callable for price P, where for simplicity P is assumed to be constant over
time. Standard valuation arguments imply that the value of such an exchange-
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+ Fe−r(T−t) + O(S,t) (4)
E (Vd,S,t d)=m a x( R(Vd,S td),S td) (5)
E (V,S = P,t)=P (6)
E (V,S → 0,t) → D(V,t) (7)
E (V,S,t = T)=m a x( S,F).( 8 )
These boundary and terminal conditions are now commented in turn. Condition
4 states that the risk of the issuer’s default vanishes as the assets V become very




+F ·e−r(T−t) is the default free value
of the cash ﬂows promised by the bond in the absence of the exchange option.
O(S,t) is the default free value of the exchange option, which is like callable
call option with maturity T,w h i c hi sc a l l e da ss o o na sS = P for a call price




−F ·e−r(T−t) and which pays the terminal payoﬀ
max(S − F,0) at time T. The exchange option O(S,t) is independent of V
as V →∞because default risk vanishes and because V does not aﬀect the




+F ·e−r(T−t) as here
assumed. In this case the exchangeable convertible is rationally called just when




+F ·e−r(T−t) the exchangeable convertible
may be called also when V rises suﬃciently.
Condition 5 states that as V = Vd the issuer defaults and exchangeable
investors can still exercise the exchange option. At default the shares underlying
8the exchangeable are worth Std a n da r eo w n e db yt h ei s s u e r .S oa td e f a u l tt h e
issuer’s total assets net of bankruptcy costs are worth Vd (1 − a)+Std and the
shares are still available for delivery if the exchange option is exercised at the
time of default td. This is the case when for example the shares are pledged
so that exchangeable investors are guaranteed to receive the shares whenever
they exercise the exchange option. If the shares are pledged, it is possible
that the exchange option be exercised also after default, but to conﬁne the
exercise to no later than the time of default seems a realistic approximation and
implies the payoﬀ max(Std − R(Vd,S td),0). R(Vd,S td) is again the recovery
value of the exchangeable convertible in bankruptcy if the exchange option is
not exercised. If the exchange option is lost upon default, condition 5 simply
becomes E (Vd,S,t d)=R(Vd,S td).
To gain insight, we can rewrite 5 as E (Vd,S,t d) = max(min(max(Vd (1 − a)+Std − Fo,0),F),S td),
which implies that at default:
-i fStd >F, the exchange option is exercised and E (Vd,S,t d)=Std;
-i fFo >V d (1 − a), the exchange option is exercised even if Std ≤ F and
again E (Vd,S,t d)=Std;
-i fFo ≤ Vd (1 − a) and if Std ≤ F, the exchange option is not exercised
and investors receive the minimum between F and the bankruptcy proceeds of
Vd + Std net of bankruptcy costs and of the payment of the face value of se-
nior creditors Fo,s ot h a tE (Vd,S,t d)=F −max(F − Vd (1 − a)+Fo − Std,0).
When Vd (1 − a) ≥ Fo, exchangeable holders may receive the full value of the un-
derlying shares even if they do not exercise the exchange option. When Fo =0 ,
9the exchangeable is the only outstanding debt and exchangeable holders will
never exercise the exchange option if Std <F.
Condition 6 states that, as the entity’s share value rises to the call price P,
the exchangeable is called and exercise of the exchange option is forced in the





+ F · e−r(T−t).
If the exchangeable is were not callable, the third condition would be E (V,S →∞ ,t) →
S. This is now explained. In the absence of the call provision, the probability
of the issuer’s default would not vanish as S →∞ , because the default barrier
Vd is a fraction of the face value of outstanding (F + Fo). This can be the case
because default is triggered by lack of liquidity and/or because, as S →∞ ,
E (V,S →∞ ,t) →∞so that the default is now triggered when V drops to a
fraction of Fo. So, even as S →∞the probability of default is positive. But, if
the issuer owns the shares, even upon default can investors exercise the exchange
option and get Std →∞instead of R(Vd,S td).
Condition 7 states that, as the shares value vanishes, the conversion option
becomes worthless and E (V,S,t) approaches D(V,t), i.e. the value of the bond
deprived of the exchange option and whose collateral is only V .
Condition 8 states that, if the issuer neither has called the exchangeable nor
has previously defaulted, at maturity T convertible holders can exchange the
face value F of the bond for shares worth S.
The conditions just exposed imply that the value of the exchangeable con-
vertible can also be viewed as the sum of a ”straight” debt plus an exchange
10option as shown in Appendix A.
If, as is here assumed, the exchange option can be exercised at the issuer’s de-
fault and the shares pay no dividends, early exercise of the ”American” callable
exchangeable convertible is not optimal if the bond is not called or if it does not
experience default and the present valuation model applies also to the ”Ameri-
can” case.
2.1 Comparative statics and the eﬀect of correlation
Comparative statics using the above model reveal the characteristics of ex-
changeable convertibles. Equation 3 has been solved through the "line" Hop-
scotch method proposed by Gourlay and McKee (1977). Appendix B describes
the details of the application of the "line" Hopscotch method to solve equation
3 subject to its boundary and terminal conditions.
The base case scenario assumes Vd =1 , a =0 .2, σv =0 .2, b =0 .05, r =0 .04,
F =1 , c =0 .03, T −t =5 , S =1 , σs =0 .3, Fo =1 , ρ =0 , P =1 .5, co =0 .047,
τ =0 .35 and the corresponding results are portrayed in Figure 1. Figure 1
shows that the value of the exchangeable convertible rises in the shares value S,
but when the shares value reaches the call price level P =1 .5 the bond is called
b yt h ei s s u e r .A st h ev a l u eo ft h ei s s u e r ’ sa s s e t sV drops to Vd =1 ,d e f a u l tt a k e s
place and investors decide to exercise the exchange option to receive the shares
value Std. In the base case investors would get even less if they did not exercise
the exchange option, because Fo >V d (1 − a). It follows that the value of the
defaulted exchangeable convertible rises in the shares value and the value of
11the non-defaulted exchangeable convertible also rises in the value of the issuer’s
assets V , because default risk decreases.
The value of the exchangeable convertible decreases in assets volatility σv
especially when the shares value is low. This is highlighted by the more pro-
nounced concavity of the function E (V,S,t) with respect to V when S is low.
The reason is that as assets volatility increases, the probability of default in-
creases and the payoﬀ to the defaulted exchangeable increases in the shares
value. So, as the shares value lowers, the loss given default on the exchange-
able convertible is higher and the bond becomes more sensitive to changes in
the probability of default and hence to changes in assets volatility σv.I t f o l -
lows that higher volatility of the issuer’s assets always decreases the value of
the exchangeable convertible, as described in Figure 2. This is a peculiarity of
exchangeable convertibles as opposed to ordinary convertibles. In fact the value
of the latter often increases in the issuer’s assets volatility, since assets volatility
increases the value of the ordinary conversion option.
Figure 3 shows that the value of the exchangeable convertible increases in
shares volatility σs, as is suggested by the convexity of the function E (V,S,t)
with respect to S. Figure 1 shows that such convexity is more accentuated when
the issuer’s assets value is high and much less accentuated when the assets value
is next to the default barrier Vd. The reason is that when V is high the default
probability is negligible and a rise in shares volatility increases the value of
the exchange option. But when V is low the probability of default is high and
upon default the payoﬀ from exercising the exchange option is linear rather than
12convex in the shares value S (in the base case).
Another peculiarity in the valuation of exchangeable convertibles is that a
rise in the correlation between the value of the shares S and the value of the
issuer’s assets V decreases the value of the exchangeable: E (V,S,t) decreases
in ρ a sp o r t r a y e db o t hi nF i g u r e s4a n d5 .T h i se ﬀect is most pronounced when
the assets V approach the default barrier Vd. Figure 1 suggests the explanation
for this since it shows that the value of the exchangeable convertible rises in
the shares value, i.e.
∂E(V,S,t)
∂S > 0,a n dt h a t
∂E(V,S,t)
∂S decreases as V rises, i.e.
∂
2E(V,S,t)
∂V∂S < 0. Equation 3 implies that, if
∂
2E(V,S,t)
∂V∂S < 0,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
variable coeﬃcient term of the cross derivative (ρσvVσ sS) reduces the value of
the function E (V,S,t).
Such result also has a more intuitive explanation: if ρ increases, high (low)
equity values S are more likely to be associated with high (low) values of the
issuer’s assets V . Loosely speaking, this means that the ”high S-high V ”a n d
”low S-low V ” corner regions in Figure 1 become more likely while the ”low
S-high V ”a n d” h i g hS-low V ” corner regions become less likely. But the the
values of the exchangeable convertible in the ”high S-high V ”c o r n e rr e g i o na r e
just slightly higher than in the ”high S-low V ” corner region, while the values of
the exchangeable convertible in the ”low S-low V ”c o r n e rr e g i o na r em u c hl o w e r
than in the the ”low S-high V ” corner region. Hence as an increase in ρ makes
the ”high S-high V ”a n d” l o wS-low V ” corner regions more likely and the
other two corner regions less likely, the value of the exchangeable convertible
must decrease. The exchangeable is more sensitive to ρ when V is low and
13when equity value S is midway between P and 0. In fact, as S is further from
P, the "call" probability decreases and the expected life of the exchangeable
lengthens. The longer the expected life of the exchangeable, the more sensitive
the exchangeable is to changes in ρ.
Figure 6 shows how reducing the call price P increases the value of the the
issuer’s call option and reduces the value of the exchangeable, even if a lower
call price reduces the probability of default on the exchangeable convertible by
increasing the "call" probability.
Increasing the default free interest rate r increases the risk neutral drifts of
the V and S processes, so as to reduce the risk neutral probability of default and
to increase the risk neutral probability that the issuer will exercise its call before
maturity T. On the other hand higher r reduces the present value of the cash
ﬂows promised to exchangeable investors (payments of coupons and principal).
The net eﬀect is that the value of an exchangeable usually decrease in r, unless
S and V are very low. When V and S are very low, an increase in r has
the dominant eﬀect of reducing the probability of default and of increasing the
expected value of Std, i.e. the expected payoﬀ upon default. This fact is relevant
for interest rate immunisation strategies involving exchangeable convertibles.
Increasing the assets payout rate b decreases the value of the exchangeable
convertible by increasing the probability of default. Increasing proportional
bankruptcy costs a and the nominal amount of the issuer’s other debt may
increase the loss given default and so decrease the value of the exchangeable.
The eﬀect of maturity is mixed. Figure 7 shows that, ceteris paribus, shorter
14time to maturity increases (decreases) the value of the exchangeable convertible
when S and V are low (high). If S and V are low, the exchange option is of
little value and convertible value is below par, but as time to maturity decreases
the convertible value increases because it is "pulled-to-par". If S is high, the
convertible trades above par because the exchange option is valuable, but shorter
maturity decreases the value of the convertible by reducing the value of the
exchange option.
After exploring the comparative statics, it is useful to contrast exchangeable
convertibles with ordinary convertibles and secured debt.
2.2 The diﬀerence with secured debt and with ordinary
convertibles
Exchangeable convertibles share some commonalities with secured debt as well
as with ordinary convertibles. Exchangeable convertibles are similar to secured
debt as the issuer holds the underlying shares. Such shares constitute some
sort of collateral, in particular when they are pledged either at bond issuance
or as the issuer defaults. But shares often are a more risky than the collateral
usually securing a ﬁrm’s debt, such as real estates of sovereign bonds. Holders of
secured debt can get hold of the collateral just in case of default, whereas holders
of exchangeable convertibles can get hold of the shares also upon spontaneous
exercise of the exchange option or upon forced exercise as the bonds are called.
In bankruptcy holders of secured debt can be satisﬁed also through liquidation
of the debtor’s assets other than collateral, should the collateral not be valuable
15enough, whereas holders of exchangeable convertibles do not have any claim on
the debtor’s assets after they have decided to exercise the exchange option.
Exchangeable convertibles are also similar to ordinary convertibles. Both
ordinary conversion options and exchange options are subject to equity risk.
Equity risk is perfectly correlated with the default risk of the issuer of an ordi-
nary convertible, but just partially correlated (if at all) to the default risk of the
issuer of an exchangeable convertible. The exchange option may become virtu-
ally worthless even while the issuer remains perfectly solvent or the exchange
option may become very valuable even while the issuer approaches bankruptcy.
So when the convertible issuer experiences distress ordinary conversion options
are usually ”out-of-the-money” while exchange options can often be ”in-the-
money” , especially in case of low correlation between the shares value S and
the value of the remaining assets of the issuer V . Moreover, unlike ordinary
conversion options, exchange options may often be exercised even when the is-
suer approaches default, especially if investors expect to lose the exchange right
during the reorganisation process that follows default. Next the eﬀect of default
risk on exchangeable convertibles and diﬀerences with ordinary convertibles are
explored in further depth.
163 EXCHANGEABLE CONVERTIBLES AND
DEFAULT RISK
This section focuses on how the value of an exchangeable convertible depends
on default risk and on contractual provisions such as a pledge on the underlying
shares, early exercise of the exchange option or call for early redemption.
3.1 Default, pledge on shares and early exercise of the
exchange option
The exchange option may be lost upon default if the issuer does not own the
underlying shares or if the issuer owns the shares but the shares are not pledged
to exchangeable investors, so that in bankruptcy all creditors would have a
claim on the shares. In this regard the ACBM suggested that ”the exchange
property should be pledged to the exchangeable investor upon default by the
issuer” (2001). Such pledge would prevent the loss of the exchange option,
because it guarantees exchangeable investors that they will be able to exercise
their exchange option even at or after the issuer’s default. If the issuer owns
the shares and the shares are pledged for conversion, the issuer will honour the
obligation to deliver the shares even if insolvent. In such case and if the shares
pay no dividends, the exchange option would not be exercised before default,
assuming default precedes maturity or early redemption.
The presence of a pledge on the shares increases the value of an exchangeable
convertible especially when the exchange option is European or early exercise
17is restricted. Instead if the event of default is predictable as implied by the
structural model presented above, if the exchange option is of American type
and if it is "in-the-money", investors can exchange their bonds for shares before
default, thus avoiding the risk of losing the exchange option upon default as the
shares are not pledged. In this case, investors may prefer early exercise of the
exchange option to a claim in bankruptcy, even in the absence of dividends paid
by the shares. This result is similar to the one in Stulz and Johnson (1987):
early exercise of a vulnerable call option eliminates the risk of losing the option
upon the issuer’s default.
So even if the shares are not pledged, the issuer’s default risk may be mit-
igated by early exercise, if the exchange option is American. But such early
exercise implies that the default free value of the exchangeable convertible is
still higher than the value of a default prone exchangeable convertible, since
the optimal exercise policy of the former implies no spontaneous early exercise
before maturity. In fact, if the issuer has no default risk and if the shares pay
no dividends, there is no incentive for investors to spontaneously exercise the
exchange option before maturity, moreover by so doing investors would forego
coupon payments. Finally, if the underlying shares pay dividends, the value
of the exchangeable decreases and spontaneous early exercise of the exchange
option may be optimal even for a default free exchangeable convertible.
183.2 Default and call of the exchangeable convertible
Whereas ordinary convertibles are called just when the issuer’s equity value
rises suﬃciently, exchangeable convertibles may be called also when the issuer
approaches distress. In fact, even if the issuer’s assets value approaches the
default barrier, the shares value may have risen suﬃciently to enable the issuer
to call the exchangeable and force exercise of the exchange option. Even if the
issuer is on the brink of default, it can still honour its obligation of delivering
the underlying shares in its possession.
As ordinary callable convertibles may be called and early conversion forced
before adverse fortunes lead the debtor to default, the same could be said of
exchangeable callable convertibles. Indeed for the latter this is a more likely
prospect especially when the correlation ρ between the underlying equity and
t h ei s s u e r ’ sa s s e t si sl o w .I tf o l l o w st h a tt h ec a l lf e a t u r em a ys i g n i ﬁcantly reduce
t h ee x p o s u r eo fe x c h a n g e a b l ec o n v e r t i b l e st od e f a u l tr i s k .
It is interesting that forced as well as non-forced exercise of the exchange
option decreases leverage and the default barrier. For example, as default is
liquidity triggered and as the shares pay no dividends, the default barrier drops
from Vd = c·F+co·Fo
b (1 − τ) before option exercise to Vd = co·Fo
b (1 − τ) after
option exercise. So even if the issuer is about to default, forced or spontaneous
exercise of the exchange option may make the issuer return to be fully solvent,
reduce expected bankruptcy costs and increases total ﬁrm value.
194M O T I V E S F O R I S S U I N G E X C H A N G E A B L E
CONVERTIBLES
The above analysis can suggest the possible motives underpinning the decision
to issue exchangeable convertibles. Brennan and Schwartz (1988) suggested that
ordinary convertibles may be issued when investors are particularly uncertain
about the issuer’s assets volatility, since ordinary convertibles are less sensitive to
assets volatility than ”straight” bonds are. But this motive seems less capable to
explain the issuance of exchangeable convertibles, whose value always decreases
in the issuer’s assets volatility.
Alternatively it is held that the issuer of exchangeable convertibles intends
to dispose of the underlying shares. Before maturity disposal of the shares can
take place as investors exchange their bonds for the underlying shares, either
when the bonds are called or when the issuer experiences distress.
A low (high) call price entails a high (low) probability that the issuer can
force exercise of the exchange option and a reduced (increased) probability of
exercise as the issuer experiences distress. When the issuer experiences distress,
the exercise of an exchange option seems more likely than the exercise of the
conversion option of an ordinary convertible, especially in case of low correlation
between the value of the shares underlying the exchangeable and the value of
issuer’s other assets. ”Exchange in distress”, as seen above, can prevent or elim-
inate the insolvency of the debtor, thus reducing the probability of bankruptcy
and hence expected bankruptcy costs.
20To corroborate the thesis that the issuer’s motive for issuing an exchangeable
convertible is disposal of the underlying shares, it is now instructive to consider
the alternative case in which the issuer does not own the underlying shares.
4.1 When the issuer does not own the shares
A key assumption in the preceding analysis has been that the issuer owns the
underlying shares. Such assumption is now dropped. Before proceeding, it
is necessary to introduce the issuer’s equity value when, ceteris paribus, the
exchangeable is absent from the issuer’s capital structure. Such equity value can
be assumed to be a time independent function of V as in Leland (1994) and is
denoted as Eq (V )=T (V )+V −Bk (V )−D(V,Fo),w h e r eT (V ) is the present
value of the debt induced tax shield, Bk (V ) are expected bankruptcy costs,
D(V,Fo) is the value of debt (with face value Fo). The formula for Eq (V ) is
reported in Appendix C. To simplify the exposition, we now consider the case of
a European type non-callable exchangeable convertible E0 (V,S,t). Then, since
assets worth V are now the only assets of the issuer, the liquidity default barrier
for t<Tis still Vd,b u ta tT default is triggered if Eq (V ) ≤ max(S,F), i.e.
if equity value after honouring the commitment to pay max(S,F) at maturity
T is not greater than the commitment itself. This condition implies that the
issuer cannot liquidate its assets in order to be able to pay max(S,F) at T.
E0 (V,S,t) still satisﬁes equation 3 and conditions 4 and 7, but conditions 5, 6
and 8 are now respectively substituted by
21E0 (Vd,S td,t d)=m i n( R(Vd),max(F,Std)) (9)
E0 (V,S →∞ ,t) → E (V,t) (10)
E0 (V,S,t = T)=1 Eq(V )>max(S,F) · max(S,F)+
+1 Eq(V )≤max(S,F)=S · max
¡
F · 1Eq(V )>F,R(V )
¢
+
+1 Eq(V )≤max(S,F)=F · max
¡
S · 1Eq(V )>S,R(V )
¢
, (11)
where R(V )=m a x ( V (1 − a) − Fo,0),w h e r e1A is the indicator function









(r − b)V − rE(V,t)+c =0
subject to







E (Vd,t d)=R(Vd) (13)
E (V,t = T)=m a x
¡
F · 1Eq(V )>F,R(V )
¢
. (14)
Condition 9 implies that the insolvent issuer may be unable to deliver the
shares underlying the exchange option if the issuer does not own them and the
22exchange option is exercised. In such case the exchange option resembles the
type of vulnerable options studied by Stulz and Johnson (1987). It may be
optimal to exercise vulnerable options before maturity even if the underlying
shares pay no dividends, when early exercise in unrestricted2.
Condition 10 states that the bond value tends to E (V,t) as S →∞ . E (V,t)
is the value of a bond similar to E (V,S,t) but that is deprived of the exchange
option and that gives investors the option to receive the greater between the
recovery value R(V ) and the face value F,w h e nEq (V ) >Fat T. The reason
is that as S →∞and investors exercise the exchange option at T,t h ei s s u e r
will be insolvent and investors will have the right to receive the recovery value
R(V ) at T. But investors will choose not to exercise the exchange option and
to keep the issuer solvent if Eq (V ) >Fand F>R (V ) at T.
The terminal condition 11 states the following. If the issuer is solvent
at T,i . e . i fEq (V ) > max(S,F), investors receive the payoﬀ max(S,F).
If the issuer is not solvent and the exchange option is "in-the-money", i.e.
Eq (V ) ≤ max(S,F)=S investors exercise the exchange option and cause
the issuer to default, thus getting the recovery value R(V ). But they will
do so just if exercising pays them more than not exercising the exchange op-
tion, as by not exercising they can keep the issuer solvent and thus receive F.
If the exchange option is "out—of-the-money" and the issuer is insolvent, i.e.
Eq (V ) ≤ max(S,F)=F, investors receive the recovery value R(V ), unless by
exercising the exchange option they can keep the issuer solvent and so receive
2Moreover the value of vulnerable options can decrease with maturity, because the default
probability increases with maturity.
23S>R (V ), i.e. unless F ≥ Eq (V ) >S>R(V ). So condition 11 implies that
the exchange option may not be exercised even it is nominally "in-the-money"
or that it may be exercised even if it is nominally "out-the-money", since the
exercise decision can aﬀect the state of solvency of the issuer when the issuer
does not own the shares.
Condition 11 highlights other diﬀerences between ordinary and exchangeable
convertibles. Whenever V> Fat maturity T, ordinary convertibles will not
experience default. Instead exchangeable convertibles may experience default
at T even when V> Fif the issuer does not own the shares and if the exchange
option is "in the money". Even if V> Fat maturity T, there is no guarantee
that the issuer will able to honour its obligation to deliver the shares, which it
would have to buy in the market as the exchange option is exercised. So, even
if V> Fat maturity T, the issuer may default if Eq (V ) <S>F.
We can conclude that, when the exchangeable convertible issuer does not own
the underlying shares, the issuer’s default probability increases, the expected
payoﬀs to the exchange option at default and at maturity decrease and hence the
value of the exchangeable convertible decreases. These considerations discourage
the issuance of exchangeable convertibles when the issuer does not own the
shares and support the widely held view that the issuer chooses to oﬀer an
exchangeable rather than an ordinary convertible precisely in order to dispose
of the underlying shares in his possession.
245C O N C L U S I O N S
T h i sp a p e rh a sf o rt h eﬁrst time studied the valuation and use of exchange-
able convertible bonds through a structural credit risk model. The following
distinctive characteristics of exchangeable convertibles have emerged.
Unlike the conversion option of ordinary convertibles, the ”exchange option”
is often valuable and worth exercising even when the issuer experiences ﬁnan-
cial distress. Since the issuer normally owns the shares underlying the exchange
option, the issuer’s default may not compromise investors’ exchange right, espe-
cially if the shares are pledged as suggested by the ACBM (2001). The exchange
option is particularly valuable if exchangeable investors are paid little in bank-
ruptcy, either because of high bankruptcy costs or because the exchangeable is
a subordinated bond. If the exchange option can be exercised at any time, early
exercise allows investors to obtain the underlying shares before default and so
makes the value of an exchangeable relatively insensitive to default risk even
if the underlying shares are not pledged and even if the exchange option were
lost upon default. Overall, pledge of shares and unrestricted early exercise are
shown to make the exchangeable quite insensitive to the issuer’s default risk.
Unlike ordinary convertibles, exchangeable convertibles may be called also
when the issuer approaches distress. Forced as well as voluntary exercise of the
exchange option can stave oﬀ bankruptcy.
Unlike the value of ordinary convertibles, the value of exchangeable convert-
ibles always decreases as the volatility of the issuer’s assets increases and also
as the correlation between the underlying shares and the issuer’s assets rises.
25When the issuer does not own the shares underlying the exchange option,
investors may not exercise the option even if the option is nominally "in-the-
money" or may exercise the option even if the option is nominally "out-the-
money", since the exercise decision can aﬀect the state of solvency of the issuer.
Finally, the present analysis suggests that the motives for issuing exchange-
able convertibles may diﬀer from the motives for issuing ordinary convertibles.
The analysis conﬁrms that the main motive for the ﬁrm to issue exchangeable
convertibles is likely to be to dispose of the underlying shares. When the call
price of the exchangeable is high, disposal of the shares is likely to take place
as and when the issuer approached distress and so it can reduce expected bank-
ruptcy costs and increase total ﬁrm value.
A The exchangeable convertible as a ”straight”
debt plus a callable exchange option
The value of exchangeable convertibles can be decomposed as the sum of "straight"
debt plus a callable exchange option, such that:
E (V,S,t)=D(V,S,t)+O(V,S,t),w h e r eD(V,S,t) is the value of ”straight”
debt and O(V,S,t) is the value of the callable exchange option. Under the same









D(Vd,S,t d)=R(Vd,S td) (16)
D(V,S →∞ ,t)=D(V,t,R(Vd,S td)=F) (17)
D(V,S → 0,t)=D(V,t) (18)
D(V,t)=F. (19)
where D(V,t) is the value of "straight" debt when the issuer does not own S and
where D(V,t,R(Vd,S td)=F) is the value of "straight" debt when its recovery
value in bankruptcy is R(Vd,S td)=F.A l s oO(V,S,t) will satisfy equation 3,
but subject to:
O(V →∞ ,S,t)=O(S,t) (20)
O(Vd,S,t d)=m a x( S − R(Vd,S td),0) (21)
O(V,S = P,t)=m a x( P − D(V,S,t),0) (22)
O(V,S → 0,t) → 0 (23)
O(V,t)=m a x( S − F,0). (24)
where O(S,t) is a default free callable exchange option as described in section
2. The callable exchange option is referred to throughout the text simply as
"exchange option".
27B The line Hopscotch method
Partial diﬀerential equation 3 was solved using and adapting the "line" Hop-
scotch method of Gourlay and McKee (1977) as follows. Assume that i, j and
k are integer numbers. Let Ek
i,j denote the approximation of the exact solution
to the PDE [i.e.E (V,S,t)]w h e nV = i · dV , S = j · dS, t = T − kdt.I no t h e r
words
Ek
i,j u E (idV,jdS,T − kdt) (25)
An "interior" grid point (idV,jdS,T − kdt) o ft h ef e a s i b l er e g i o ni sap o i n t
such that imin <i<I , 0 <j<J , 0 <k<K .H e r e imin is such that
dV · imin = Vd, I is the grid’s upper limit to i, J is the grid’s upper limit to j
and K is such that t0 = T −Kdt., where t0 is the present time. Then equation
3 can be approximated as follows:
















































































































The implicit scheme can be quickly solved through a successive over-relaxation
(SOR) algorithm. The boundary conditions to this Hopscotch scheme can be




















Rimin,j approximates the bond recovery value, R(Vd,S td),s ot h a t
Rimin,j =m i n( m a x( dV · imin (1 − a)+j · dS − Fo,0),F) u R(Vd,S td).
To ensure accuracy and stability, the simulation results displayed in the
Figures were derived using the following grid parameters: dV = 5·Vd
I , dS = 2
J,
I =5 0 , J =5 0 , imin = Vd
dV , dt = 1
300, Kdt = T − t0.
C Equity value when the issuer does not own
the shares
Following Leland (1994), if the issuer does not own the shares underlying the
exchangeable convertible, if outstanding debt with face value Fo is a perpetuity,
if default is liquidity triggered, if the exchangeable convertible is absent or has
been removed from the issuer’s capital structure, the issuer’s equity value is:
Eq (V )=T (V )+V − Bk (V ) − D(V,Fo),
where








































b (1 − τ).
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Figure 1: Value of a callable exchangeable convertible in the base case.





















When asset V volatility is 0.3: V=1.5
When asset V volatility is 0.3: V=2.5
Figure 2: Base case scenario as asset V volatility is changed.





















When shares volatility is 0.2: V=1.5
When shares volatility is 0.2: V=2.5
Figure 3: Base case scenario as the shares volatility is changed.



















When correlation is 0.5: V=1.5
When correlation is 0.5: V=2.5
When correlation is -0.5: V=1.5
When correlation is -0.5: V=2.5
Figure 4: Base case scenario as correlation is changed.


















When correlation is 0.5: S=0.52
When correlation is 0.5: S=1
When correlation is -0.5: S=0.52
When correlation is -0.5: S=1
Figure 5: Base case scenario as correlation is changed.























Figure 6: Base case scenario as the call price P is changed.























Figure 7: Base case scenario as time to maturity is changed.
41